Research
Peer-Reviewed Publications
"Racial Injustice and Information Flow," Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, forthcoming.
"How Racial Injustice Affects News-Based Inferences," Episteme, doi:10.1017/epi.2020.35, 2020.
"Expression-Style Exclusion," Social Epistemology, 33:3, 245-261, 2019.
“Are Our Racial Concepts Necessarily Essentialist Due to Our Cognitive Nature?” APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy, 19:1, 19-24, 2019.
Invited Publications
"On Anticipatory-Epistemic Injustice and the Distinctness of Epistemic-Injustice Phenomena," Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 10: 7, 48-57, 2021.
"Judging Students and Racial Injustice," APA Newsletter/Latino Issues in Philosophy, 21: 1, 15-20, 2021.
"Racial Injustice and Information Flow," Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, forthcoming.
"How Racial Injustice Affects News-Based Inferences," Episteme, doi:10.1017/epi.2020.35, 2020.
"Expression-Style Exclusion," Social Epistemology, 33:3, 245-261, 2019.
“Are Our Racial Concepts Necessarily Essentialist Due to Our Cognitive Nature?” APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy, 19:1, 19-24, 2019.
Invited Publications
"On Anticipatory-Epistemic Injustice and the Distinctness of Epistemic-Injustice Phenomena," Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 10: 7, 48-57, 2021.
"Judging Students and Racial Injustice," APA Newsletter/Latino Issues in Philosophy, 21: 1, 15-20, 2021.
Papers Under Review
Injustice and Understanding: Diminishment in a Speaker's Capacity to Convey Understanding
I describe what I call a comprehensive speech act in which a speaker engenders a sufficient degree of understanding in her audience. And I explain how racial prejudice can diminish a speaker's capacity to perform this speech act.
Belief Content and Rationality: Why Racist Beliefs Are Never Epistemically Rational
In the epistemology literature epistemologists have argued that there is a class of beliefs that are seemingly both racist and rational to believe given one’s evidence. I argue that in the context of the US no such belief class exists.
Vindicating Cross-Generational Blame: Why Blaming Christopher Columbus and Robert E. Lee is Appropriate
I argue that protesters appropriately blame historical figures such as Christopher Columbus and Robert E. Lee when they topple and deface monuments that honor them because present-day subjects can appropriately blame historical figures such as Columbus and Lee for their wrongdoings.
Race and Evaluation of Philosophical Skill: A Virtue Theoretical Explanation of Why People of Color Are So Absent from Philosophy
I explain how racial injustice and white supremacy depress the degree to which Black, Indigenous and Latinx folks can manifest their philosophical skill. And I explain why racial injustice and white supremacy negatively affect the capacity of Ph.D. program admissions committee members to accurately evaluate Black, Indigenous and Latinx applicants' philosophical skill.
How White Supremacy Affect Hip Hop as a Hermeneutical Resource
I consider how hip-hop functions as a hermeneutical resource and I take up how white supremacy and capitalism degrade this resource’s hermeneutical efficacy.
Racial Injustice and the Flow of Information
This paper takes up racial injustice’s effect on how information flows in communities.
Monograph in Progress
Ignorance of Racial Injustice: Why It Prevails and What We Can Do About It
Papers in Progress
When Knowledge Is Not Enough
I take up how subjects who have understanding of race relations are more likely than subjects who have mere knowledge about relations to avoid holding false beliefs about race relations.
The Expansion of the Concept of Whiteness and the Latinx Community
Some philosophers of race have argued that the concept of whiteness will expand to include many groups now not considered white such that whites will remain the majority racial group in the US. I argue that this view of whiteness’ expansion relies on a false assumption of race and theory of assimilation.
Racial Injustice and Conversational Norms
I argue that racial prejudice can make non-dominant speakers more likely to violate Grice’s conversational maxims. And I argue that a consequence of this is that even if a hearer believes a non-dominant speaker during the initial stages of a conversation, the hearer will likely disbelieve these initial claims by the conversation’s end.
Epistemic Blocking
I argue that the epistemic states such as knowledge, belief and understanding can play what I call a blocking role. An epistemic state blocks if a subject who is in that state is less likely to come to hold a false belief or false beliefs in a certain domain. I argue that understanding often successfully blocks when knowledge cannot.
The Valladolid Debate: How Power Relations Affect Its Structure
I argue that the agreement and disagreement between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in the Valladolid debate can be explained by both their different positions in the power structure of the Spanish Empire and the human disposition to avoid holding a certain class of beliefs. A consequence of this argument is that Las Casas’ views of Indigenous persons is put into sharper relief.
Ignorance of Racial Injustice: Why It Prevails and What We Can Do About It
Papers in Progress
When Knowledge Is Not Enough
I take up how subjects who have understanding of race relations are more likely than subjects who have mere knowledge about relations to avoid holding false beliefs about race relations.
The Expansion of the Concept of Whiteness and the Latinx Community
Some philosophers of race have argued that the concept of whiteness will expand to include many groups now not considered white such that whites will remain the majority racial group in the US. I argue that this view of whiteness’ expansion relies on a false assumption of race and theory of assimilation.
Racial Injustice and Conversational Norms
I argue that racial prejudice can make non-dominant speakers more likely to violate Grice’s conversational maxims. And I argue that a consequence of this is that even if a hearer believes a non-dominant speaker during the initial stages of a conversation, the hearer will likely disbelieve these initial claims by the conversation’s end.
Epistemic Blocking
I argue that the epistemic states such as knowledge, belief and understanding can play what I call a blocking role. An epistemic state blocks if a subject who is in that state is less likely to come to hold a false belief or false beliefs in a certain domain. I argue that understanding often successfully blocks when knowledge cannot.
The Valladolid Debate: How Power Relations Affect Its Structure
I argue that the agreement and disagreement between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in the Valladolid debate can be explained by both their different positions in the power structure of the Spanish Empire and the human disposition to avoid holding a certain class of beliefs. A consequence of this argument is that Las Casas’ views of Indigenous persons is put into sharper relief.